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Comments

California Entrapment LawA Need For Statutory Clarification
The uncertainty which envelops the defense of entrapment
runs the gamut from its theoretical basis to its practical applicacation, and often strands both bench and bar on the shoals
of confusion. The United States Supreme Court recently confirmed its traditionalview that the predisposition of the defendant
controls the application of the defense. Four dissenting members of the Court, however, advocated the objective, police conduct approach. California courts, while purportedly adopting this
minority view, have reached a "compromise" position incorporating elements of both theories. This compromise stance has led to
theoretical,procedural, and evidentiary difficulties. It is this compromise and its attendant difficulties which serve as the focal point
of this comment. Following an analysis of the appropriate federal and California cases, the author calls for, and offers, a statutory provision which would embody the California approach and
render the entrapmentdefense more certain.
On April 24, 1973, the United States Supreme Court, in United States
v. Russell,1 took the opportunity presented by the appeal of a narcotics offense prosecution to reiterate the long-standing federal rationale for the entrapment defense. The decision marks the third
time in 41 years that a slim five-justice majority of the Court has held
that the predisposition of the defendant, rather than the nature of the
government's inducement, is the key to the entrapment defense. The
Russell decision reversed a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals finding
that the defendant was entrapped as a matter of law when an undercover narcotics agent supplied the defendant, who was already engaged in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamines, commonly
1. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
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known as "speed," with an essential ingredient which was legally available but difficult to obtain. 2
The Russell pronouncement is timely in that it comes in the wake

of several lower federal court decisions which had considerably broadened the availability of the defense.3 In addition, the decision comes
at a time when the number of prosecutions for drug-related offenses,
which presently account for the vast majority of entrapment situations,
continues to grow.

Use of the defense has kept pace with the in-

creased number of prosecutions.4
The defense of entrapment has never been codified at either the
federal level' or in the vast majority of the states. 6 It has been created and developed solely by the courts, and the case-by-case evolu-

tion of standards for entrapment has understandably caused its application to be surrounded with uncertainty, both at the federal and
state level.

This comment will explore the rationale for the entrapment defense
in California and demonstrate the uncertainties, as manifested in Cal-

ifornia cases, pertaining to its use. Within the last fifteen years several major decisions in this state have failed to reduce the amount
of confusion which attends assertion of entrapment.7 A premise of
this comment is that any attempt to categorize California's formulation
of the defense into one or the other of the contrasting approaches that
have traditionally divided the United States Supreme Court would be
misguided. An analysis of California cases will demonstrate that the
entrapment defense in this state has evolved as a hybrid, or "compromise," between the two federal formulations. This rather unique
2. The court of appeals found that the agent had furnished "an intolerable degree of governmental participation in the criminal enterprise." United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1972).
3. See, for example, Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Chisum, 312
F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
4. Interview with Judge Robert Puglia, Sacramento County Superior Court, Sacramento, Calif., Dec. 13, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Puglia].
5. Legislation before Congress in 1973 contemplated an express statutory formulation of the entrapment defense. S. 1, §1-3B2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
6. To date only four states have codified the defense of entrapment. ILL. ANN.
STAT. cb. 38, §7-12 (1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. §21-3210 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. PENAL
LAw §40.05 (McKinney Supp. 1970); Wis. STAT. §339.44 (1958). A statutory definition of entrapment is contained in legislation before the California Legislature in 1974.
S.B. 39, 1973-74 Regular Session. Patterned after definitions found in many California
entrapment cases, the proposed codification fails to identify the hybrid status of the
entrapment defense as it has evolved in California decisions and which will be discussed within this comment. In its present form, the definition does little more than
codify the present confusion which surrounds entrapment law in the State.
7. It has been suggested that sometimes a defendant's best approach towards use
of the entrapment defense is to "entrap" the court over an uncertainty in regards to
the law surrounding its application. Puglia.
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position is workable and embodies the most appealing aspects of both
federal formulations of the defense. Unfortunately, California's stance
remains unarticulated and, as reflected in the cases, largely misunderstood. This points to the need for a statutory formulation of the defense which would embody the compromise approach as it has evolved
in California cases.
The same factors which serve to make Russell a timely decision on
the federal level apply equally to an exploration of California's approach to the entrapment defense and to the need for a statutory recognition of such. An initial analysis c F the Russell decision will reveal the contrasting approaches to the issue of entrapment at the federal level which in turn serve as a focal point for disagreement in California.
THE FEDERAL APPROACH

A.

HistoricalDevelopment of the Defense

Both Russell and the two important cases that preceded it, Sorrells v. United States" and Sherman v. United States,9 sharply divided
the Supreme Court over the definition of the entrapment defense. At
issue in all three cases was the proper basis, scope, and focus for the
defense. These questions also constitute the root of uncertainties
which adhere to application of the defense in California. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Russell, reaffirmed the stance the
Court had adopted when it first recognized the defense of entrapment in Sorrells. The majority in Sorrellsdefined entrapment as
the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his
procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion or fraud of the of0
ficer.'
The majority formulation of the defense thus was designed to prohibit law enforcement officers from instigating a criminal act by "persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and
to punish them."" An inducement by law enforcement officers established the defense only if the defendant was not predisposed to
commit the crime involved, and the determination of predisposition
was delegated to the jury as a question of fact.
The majority rationale appears to have been predicated upon "an
8.
9.
10.
11.

287 U.S. 435 (1932).
356 U.S. 369 (1958).
287 U.S. at 454.
Id. at 448.
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unexpressed intent of Congress to exclude from its criminal statutes
the prosecution and conviction of persons 'otherwise innocent,' who
have been lured to the commission of the prohibited act through the
Government's instigation."' 2 This "subjective approach" therefore
focuses, through an "origin of intent test," upon the conduct and propensities of the particular defendant-if the defendant is found to
have been predisposed to commit the crime, he cannot avail himself of
the defense regardless of the nature of the government's conduct. The
Russell decision may have tempered the Court's apparent indifference to the nature of the police conduct towards a predisposed
defendant by leaving open the possibility that sufficiently "outrage-

ous" government behavior could immunize a defendant from prosecution regardless of his predisposition. 13 In such a case, however, a
defendant apparently would not assert an entrapment defense, but
rather, argue that due process safeguards forbid such conduct. 14
The concurring justices in Sorrells and Sherman agreed with the
findings of entrapment, but based their rationale on grounds of public policy.' 5 The "police conduct" view of the defense taken by
these justices was reflected in their articulation of the purposes for the
defense. They rejected the majority rationale that the defense was
grounded on an unexpressed intent of Congress to exclude from punishment "otherwise innocent" defendants, believing instead that the
defense was designed to deter police conduct which fell below standards "to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of gov16
ernmental power.'
The focus under the so-called "objective test" is thus upon the nature of the police conduct and not upon the particular propensities
and predisposition of the defendant. The determination to be made
under this view is whether, regardless of the defendant's predisposition, the government has acted in a manner likely to instigate a criminal offense. This determination is a question of law, 17 to be ascertained by the trial court and not the jury. The purpose, focus, and
scope of the entrapment defense can thus vary rather widely in certain instances depending on which formulation is adopted.
12. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 440 (1973) (Stewart, J.,dissenting,
in discussing the majority rationale to which he objected).
13. Id. at 431-32.
14. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
15. "[C]ertain police conduct to ensnare . . . [a defendant] into further crime
is not to be tolerated by an advanced society." Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
369, 383 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
16. Id. at 382.
17. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932) (Roberts, J.,concurring).

606
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B.

The Russell Decision

The majority in Russell specifically rejected an argument that the
the defense of entrapment should be of constitutional dimensions. Defendant Russell had argued that the undercover agent's degree of involvement in the manufacture of methamphetamines, through the
furnishing of a legally obtainable but scarce ingredient, was so excessive as to violate fundamental principles of due process, and that
the same factors that led the Court to apply the exclusionary rule to
illegal searches and seizures 18 should be considered in regard to entrapment. Justice Rehmquist found the analogy imperfect for two reasons. First, dismissal of the entire prosecution would go much further
than the exclusionary rule, which bars only evidence obtained illegally.' 9
Secondly, unlike the decisions in Mapp v. Ohio2 ° and Miranda v. Arizona,2" the agent's conduct in Russell violated "no independent
constitutional right of the respondent."2
As an alternative to his constitutional argument, defendant Russell's second contention was that the Court should broaden the nonconstitutional defense of entrapment. In disposing of this contention,
Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed the continuing validity of the majority
rationale as expressed in Sorrells and Sherman. He cited the need
for both infiltration of drug rings and limited participation in unlawful manufacturing enterprises in view of the fact that "It]he illicit
manufacture of drugs is not a sporadic, isolated criminal incident, but
a continuing, though illegal, buiness enterprise."2 3 Although acknowledging that that several decisions of the United States district courts and
courts of appeals had gone beyond the majority rationale in Sorrells and
Sherman by focusing on "over-zealous law enforcement," 24 the majority
in Russell cited precedent as establishing entrapment as a relatively
limited defense which is rooted in the implied notion "that Congress could
not have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has committed all the elements of a prescribed offense, but was induced to commit
them by the government."2 5 Thus it is only when a government agent or
officer goes beyond the mere furnishing of an opportunity for the commission of the crime, and actually implants the criminal intent in the
mind of the defendant, that the defense will lie.
18.
(1914).
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
411 U.S. at 430.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
411 U.S. at 430.
Id. at 432.
See, for example, Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783, 789 (9th Cir. 1971).
411 U.S. at 435.
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The four dissenting justices 26 aligned themselves with the police
conduct approach espoused by the concurring opinions in Sorrells
and Sherman. Justice Stewart noted that both the Proposed New
Federal Criminal Code2 7 and the Model Penal Code 28 had adopted
this objective approach. Although not cited by the dissenting justices, legislation before Congress in 1973, which would give the entrapment defense a statutory formulation, also appears to embody the
29
police conduct approach.
CALIFORNIA'S COMPROMISE APPROACH

California's approach to the nature, purpose, and scope of the entrapment defense might appropriately be called a compromise between the contrasting formulations that have divided the United
States Supreme Court in the three leading federal cases previously
discussed. This middle ground approach has never been precisely articulated, however, and the resulting uncertainty has manifested itself
in various ways. 30
Before 1959, the California Supreme Court adhered to the predisposition approach as it was articulated in the majority opinions in
Sorrells and Sherman, and placed primary emphasis upon a determination of whether the defendant harbored a preexisting criminal intent when he was solicited by a police agent to commit a crime.31
The court also adopted the rationale that an entrapped defendant was
innocent of the crime alleged, since the criminal intent was pre32
sumed to be lacking.
In 1959, the court rejected this view in People v. Benford,88 declaring that entrapment is a defense not because the accused is innocent,
but because of a judicial policy discouraging police officers from fostering crime.8 4 Entrapment was said to rest upon grounds of "sound
26. Justices Douglas, Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall.

27. NATIONAL COMMSSION ON REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, PRO-

PosED NEW FEDERAL CRiNAL CODE §702 (Final Report, 1971).

28. MODEL PENAL CODE §2.13 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
29. S. 1, §1-3B2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The terminology in the federal
legislation is closely analogous to that used in the Proposed Official Draft of the Model
Penal Code, except for the conspicuous absence in the federal legislation of committal
of the determination of entrapment to the trial court, rather than the jury.
30. See text accompanying notes 51-92 infra.
31. See, for example, People v. Malotte, 46 Cal. 2d 59, 292 P.2d 517 (1956);

People v. Braddock, 41 Cal. 2d 794, 264 P.2d 521 (1953).
32. People v. Jackson, 42 Cal. 2d 540, 268 P.2d 6 (1954).
33. 53 Cal. 2d 1, 345 P.2d 928 (1959).

34. "Entrapment is a defense not because the defendant is innocent but because
'it is a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government
should play an ignoble part.'" Id. at 9, 345 P.2d at 934, citing from Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, I., concurring).
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public policy,"3 5 and the court adopted the reasoning of the minority
justices in Sorrells and Sherman. The court acknowledged that the precise nature of this policy had not been spelled out in any California entrapment case, but stated that recognition of the defense was prompted
by reasons similar to those that caused the court to adopt an exclusionary rule as to violations of constitutional guarantees. 36 However, the decision also acknowledged that the tests and definitions of
entrapment actually utilized by the California courts reflected the federal origin of intent approach, with availability of the defense predicated upon a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant,
as determined by the finder of fact.
Uncertainty as to the proper basis and scope for the defense in
California was further exhibited in the 1970 case of People v.
Moran,3" which quoted the Benford rationale approvingly but also realigned California with the predisposition test set forth by the majority opinions of Sorrells and Sherman. In Moran, predisposition of the
defendant, or lack thereof, was said to be the controlling element as to
availability of the defense.3 8 The court, adhering to the police conduct rationale, cited Benford's premise that the entrapment defense was
created as a control on illegal police conduct yet left the determination
of applicability of the defense to the jury, which used the origin of intent
test as advocated by the federal majority approach. The Moran case
typifies California's present compromise approach to the entrapment defense. Although predicated upon a deterrence objective, the defense is
successful only when the defendant convinces the finder of fact that the
criminal intent originated in the mind of the police agent. The internal consistency of this approach will be explored below.
This rather unique stance assumed by the majority in Moran drew
a strong dissent from Chief Justice Traynor, who favored the police
conduct rationale of Benford and felt that theoretical consistency demanded that the determination of impermissible police conduct
be made by the trial court. 39 He cited what he believed to be an inconsistency in application of the defense arising out of the fact that
cases following Benford had repeatedly used the origin of intent test
and committed the entrapment issue to the jury. 40 Traynor's dissent
expressed concern that California had "departed from the rationale of
35. 53 Cal. 2d at 8-9, 345 P.2d at 933.
36. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
37. 1 Cal. 3d 755, 463 P.2d 763, 83 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1970).
38. Id. at 760, 463 P.2d at 765, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
39. Id. at 763, 463 P.2d at 767, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 415.
40. See, for example, People v. Tambini, 275 Cal. App. 2d 757, 80 Cal. Rptr.
179 (1969); People v. Hawkins, 210 Cal. App. 2d 669, 27 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1962).
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the Benford case and seriously undermined the deterrent effect of the
entrapment defense on impermissible police conduct."'1 1 The dissent
also noted that post-Benford cases, adhering to the rule that the defense
should be determined by the jury, had not discussed the impact of the
Benford case on that rule.
Despite Justice Traynor's objections, the California Supreme Court
has continued to apply the rule that the availability of the entrapment defense depends upon whether the intent to commit the crime
originated in the mind of the defendant or in the mind of the inducing police agent.4 2 However, the soundness of this approach has not
been left unquestioned.
The only California entrapment case recent enough to analyze the
Russell opinion is the July 1973 decision of People v. Pial.48 In
Pijal, the court, citing Justice Traynor's Moran dissent, observed that
"[sitrong and persuasive arguments have been made that since the defense of entrapment is based on policy considerations rather than
on the issue of guilt or innocence, its determination should be made
by the court."' 4 The decision agreed with the Moran dissent that such
should be the rule in California and intimated that Russell had been
decided contrary to the soundness of this argument.4 5 Nevertheless,
the court in Pijal acknowledged that in California, despite Benford's
adoption of the police conduct rationale, the issue of entrapment has
continued to be left to the trier of fact.4 6
A 1973 California Supreme Court case, Patty v. Board of Medical
Examiners,4 7 reaffirmed Benford's police conduct rationale and cited
approvingly a federal district court's characterization of entrapment as
"an affront to the basic concepts of justice. ' 48 Again, however, an origin of intent test for entrapment was applied as in Moran.40 Neither the Patty case nor a second recent California Supreme Court decision5 6 discusses the propriety or consistency of delegating the deter41. 1 Cal. 3d at 764-65, 463 P.2d at 768, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
42. Recent cases include People v. Uhlemann, 9 Cal. 3d 662, 511 P.2d 609, 108
Cal. Rptr. 657 (1973), and Patty v. Board of Medical Examiners, 9 Cal. 3d 356, 508
P.2d 1121, 107 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1973).
43. 33 Cal. App. 3d 682, 109 Cal. Rptr. 230 (1973).
44. Id. at 694, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
45. Id. at 693, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
46. The Pijal decision described this development in California case law as
"ironic." Id. at 694, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 237. Arguably, however, both Justice Traynor's
Moran dissent and the Pijal decision over-relied on Benford for the proposition that
the determination of entrapment was to be a function of the court, because nowhere
in Benford does the court describe this determination as a question of law.
47. 9 Cal. 3d 356, 508 P.2d 1121, 107 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1973).
48. United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307, 1312 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
49. The Patty decision contributed to California law on entrapment by extending
availability of the defense to administrative proceedings.
50. People v. Uhlemann, 9 Cal. 3d 662, 511 P.2d 609, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1973).

610
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mination of entrapment to the finder of fact when the rationale for
the defense, as expressed in Benford and reaffirmed in Moran and
Patty, is said to rest upon grounds of public policy dictating against
impermissible police conduct.
UNCERTAINTIES OVER ASSERTION OF THE DEFENSE

Uncertainties pertaining to assertion of entrapment arise from the
fact that in California the defense is based on a police conduct rationale while its practical application resembles the Russell origin of
intent test.
A.

The Sua Sponte Issue

As the Pijal case demonstrates, California defendants have argued
on appeal that because the courts continue to expound the police
conduct rationale, the duty should rest with the trial court to root out
the effects of illegal police conduct upon its own initiative if necessary. The court in Pijal acknowledged that if California followed
in practice what it had espoused in theory in Benford, then the obligation would "clearly rest upon the trial judge to sua sponte determine whether entrapment did or did not occur." 51 But noting that
the cases subsequent to Benford had "ironically" strayed from this
theory, the court concluded that a California trial judge is under no
duty to instruct the jury sua sponte on the issue of entrapment because entrapment is an affirmative defense and its assertion is purely
a matter of tactics and strategy. 52 The Pijal decision was contrary to
the 1972 holding in People v. Grantham,"' which was based upon
dictum in People v. Perez."4
B.

Allocation of the Burden of Proof

In a number of cases defendants have raised the issue as to the
quantum of evidence necessary to prove entrapment. Although several older California decisions appeared to place -the burden on the
defendant to prove entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence, 55
51. 33 Cal. App. 3d 682, 695, 109 Cal. Rptr. 230, 237 (1973).
52. It does not appear, however, that trial judges necessarily have an aversion to

giving such an instruction sua sponte, and some have expressed no reluctance to raise
the entrapment issue on their own initiative, if necessary, when the facts merit. Puglia.
53. 26 Cal. App. 3d 661, 103 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1972).

54. "When the evidence does show such conduct, the court has a duty to root
its effects out of the trial upon its own initiative if necessary." 62 Cal. 2d 769, 775,
401 P.2d 934, 937, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326, 329 (1965).
55. See, for example, People v. D'Agostino, 190 Cal. App. 2d 447, 11 Cal. Rptr.
847 (1961); People v. Ballard, 145 Cal. App. 2d 94, 302 P.2d 89 (1956).
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it was not until 1966 in People v. Valverde 6 that such was conclusively established. The issue, however, surfaced again in Moran
where the argument was made that California Penal Code Section 1096, which requires the prosecution to establish the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, is applicable to entrapment. This
contention that the prosecution should be required to prove lack of
entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt was soundly rejected by the
court which reasoned, citing Benford's police conduct rationale, that
the issue of entrapment is not subject to Penal Code Section 1096
because the defense in California is not based on the defendant's innocence.

57

Despite Moran's apparent resolution of this issue, recent cases
indicate that the practical significance of the police conduct rationale,
as articulated in Benford and reaffirmed in Moran and Patty, has
not been fully realized by California defense attorneys. In People v.
Farley,58 a defendant unsuccessfully contended that the trial record
contained sufficient evidence of entrapment to place the burden of
proving its absence upon 'the prosecution. As recently as 1972, in
People v. Perez,5" a defendant made an unsuccessful argument similar to that pursued in Moran to the effect that California's jury instructions on entrapment 0 were in conflict with Penal Code Section
1096.61
C. Proof of Predisposition
Under a true police conduct approach, as delineated in the concurring opinions in Sorrells, Sherman, and the dissent in Russell,
entrapment would be determined solely by examination of the police
conduct, irrespective of a subjective consideration of the predisposition of the particular defendant.0 2 Even though Benford adopted this
police conduct reasoning in theory, the decision also clearly acknow56. 246 Cal. App. 2d 318, 54 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1966).
57. See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
58. 19 Cal. App. 3d 215, 96 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1971).
59. 27 Cal. App. 3d 352, 103 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1972).
60. The defendant in Perez was referring to CALrFoRNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONSCmamNAL [hereinafter cited as CALIIC] No. 4.63 (1970) which reads: "The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entrapped into commission of the crime." California's current jury instructions on entrapment are contained in CAiLJIC Nos. 4.60-4.63.
61. Federal case law, at least in the Ninth Circuit, appears to take a contrary
view on this issue, in that at least one case has held that it is the prosecutor's burden
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and this burden must be accompanied by
proving that the defendant was not wrongfully entrapped. Notaro v. United States,
363 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1966).
62. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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ledged that the tests for entrapment used by California courts have
placed "at least as much emphasis on the susceptibility of the defendant as on the propriety of the methods of the police."6 3 Hence,
an issue in several California cases has been the admissibility of evidence of prior criminal offenses to prove that the defendant harbored a preexisting criminal intent.
Federal courts allow the prosecution to prove a defendant's willingness to commit the crime by evidence that he has previously committed similar crimes or has a criminal reputation.64 In California evidence of past criminal involvement to prove a preexisting criminal
intent has traditionally been inadmissible.6" However, a 1974 court
of appeal decision, People v. Foster,66 casts doubt upon this rule by
holding that evidence of a prior conviction is, in the discretion of
the trial court, properly admissible on the issue of entrapment. It
is unclear how great an impact the Foster ruling will have. The
California Supreme Court in Benford firmly stated that evidence of
prior criminal conduct or reputation was inadmissible on the issue of
entrapment. The court in Foster based its holding on a more recent
supreme court case, People v. Schader.6 7 In Schadr, which dealt
generally with the admissibility of evidence of prior offenses in a
criminal prosecution, the court rejected the "mechanically automatic
rules" which had evolved decisionally, and held that the use of such
evidence depended "upon the trial court's consideration of the unique
facts and issues of each case." The court adopted and emphasized language of an earlier authority:
When [the other offense's] probative value, addressed to the crime
charged, is great to prove a vital issue as compared with the lesser
likelihood that a jury will be led astray and convict an innocent
man because of his bad record, the evidence should be admitted. 6s
The logic of the Foster case is persuasive and may indicate the direction the California Supreme Court would take if faced with the
specific question. Regardless of the eventual impact of the Foster
holding, as a practical matter evidence of prior criminal offenses often
slips into the record as evidence admissible to show the defendant's
63. 53 Cal. 2d 1, 9-10, 345 P.2d 928, 934 (1959).
64. See, for example, Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 375 (1958).
65. People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 11, 345 P.2d 928, 935 (1959), is the authority most often cited in California cases for this rule. For a general discussion of the
policy behind exclusion of character evidence, see C. McCoRMIcE, LAw OF EVIDENCE
§186 et seq. (2d ed. 1972).
66. 36 Cal. App. 3d 594, 111 Cal. 1ptr. 666 (1974).
67. 71 Cal. 2d 761, 457 P.2d 841, 80 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
68. Id. at 774, 457 P.2d at 848, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 8, citing People v. Sheets, 251
Cal. App. 2d 759, 764-65, 59 Cal. Rptr. 777, 781 (1967).
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criminal scheme and method, 9 his knowledge and criminal intent,70 and
71
for impeachment purposes.
Although the admissibility of evidence of prior criminal offenses is
uncertain, other types of evidence are admissible to show a general willingness on a defendant's part -tocommit a crime. Such evidence includes
the readiness with which a defendant, following solicitation by a police informant or agent, commits the crime,72 the defendant's own
testimony or extrajudicial admissions,7" and the fact that the crime
committed is one of a kind habitually committed.7 4 Regarding the
readiness of a defendant to commit a crime, however, one California
decision has held that even "hair trigger susceptibility" to an agent's
suggestion, "standing alone, does not negative entrapment as a mat75
ter of law."1
D.

Assertion of Inconsistent Defenses

Since California courts, on the authority of Benford and cases approving its rationale, reject the federal majority theory that the defense of entrapment goes to the guilt or innocence of the defendant,
the issue has arisen as to whether a defendant may deny commission
of the crime yet also allege that his actions were induced by law enforcement officers or their agents. Prior to 1965 the issue was unsettled. In People v. West 76 the presentation of inconsistent defenses was sanctioned, but later cases were contrary.77 Finally, in
People v. Perez, the California Supreme Court held that a defendant
need not admit guilt to establish the defense."
The court's reasoning was that "a rule designed to deter such unlawful [police] conduct
69. See, for example, People v. Schubin, 166 Cal. App. 2d 267, 332 P.2d 737

(1958).

70. People v. Pijal, 33 Cal. App. 3d 682, 690-91, 109 Cal. Rptr. 230, 235 (1973).
71. Id. The point has been made that evidence of prior criminal conduct may
indirectly be admitted in another way. A defendant necessarily must take the witness
stand in order to give his version of the facts which he claims indicates evidence of
entrapment. In doing so, if he should claim he was "never" criminally predisposed,
evidence of prior criminal conduct may work its way into the record simply to clarify
what the defendant meant by "never." Interview with Harold Truett, Main County
Public Defender, San Rafael, Calif., Dec. 28, 1973.
72. See, for example, People v. Ramos, 146 Cal. App. 2d 110, 303 P.2d 783
(1956); People v. Caudillo, 138 Cal. App. 2d 183, 291 P.2d 191 (1955).
73. See, for example, People v. Raffington, 98 Cal. App. 2d 455, 220 P.2d 967
(1950).
74. See, for example, People v. Schwartz, 109 Cal. App. 2d 450, 240 P.2d 1024
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cannot properly be restricted by compelling a defendant to incriminate
himself as a condition to invoking the rule.""9 The federal approach
to the issue of pleading inconsistent defenses generally appears to be
contrary to that of California.8"
The Pijal case discussed a practical problem in California which
arises when the contradictory defenses of alibi and entrapment are
pursued. A defendant electing to assert an alibi defense is necessarily prevented from making a strong evidentiary showing of entrapment."' In such cases, since Pijal rejects the idea 'that a trial court
faces a sua sponte obligation to instruct the jury on the question of
entrapment, the defense will most likely fail.
E.

Application of the Defense to Acts of Inducement by Private
Citizens

A final issue which may not be entirely resolved at the present
time, and which appears to have its source in the uncertain foundations for the entrapment defense in California law, is whether the defense applies to acts of inducement on the part of private citizens.
In a 1970 decision, People v. Gregg, the Third District Court of Appeal considered this issue and held that any rule extending the defense of entrapment to a defendant induced to commit a crime by
one not connected with law enforcement officers would be unsupported, contrary to case law, and isolated from the policy underlying
the entrapment defense.8 2 The appeal was prompted by an endorsement in Moran of a trial court's jury instruction to the effect that if
the crime was suggested by another person, whether or not a law enforcement officer, the entrapment defense could be applicable. 3 The
Moran court's authority for approval was two jury instructions on
entrapment published in California Jury Instructions-Criminal
(CALJIC). 4 The Gregg decision classified the Moran endorsement
as mere dictum s5 to which stare decisis -principles need not apply. This
79. Id. at 775, 401 P.2d at 938, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
80. Most circuits that have considered the issue have denied the right of a defendant to submit the inconsistent defenses of denial and entrapment. See, for example,
United States v. Shameia, 464 F.2d 629 (6th Cir. 1972). But see Crisp v. United
States, 262 F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1954) (dictum).
81. 33 Cal. App. 3d 682, 696, 109 Cal. Rptr. 230, 238 (1973).
82. 5 Cal. App. 3d 502, 508, 85 Cal. Rptr. 273, 277 (1970).
83. 1 Cal. 3d 755, 761, 463 P.2d 763, 766, 83 Cal. Rptr. 411, 414 (1970).
84. CAIJIC No. 851 reads: "The law does not tolerate one person, particularly
a law enforcement officer, generating in the mind of another person who is innocent
of any criminal purpose, the original intent to commit a crime . . . ." The revision
of CALJIC No. 851 into CALJIC No. 4.60, currently in use, does not appear to have
remedied this problem. CAIC No. 4.60 reads: "A person is not guilty of crime
when he commits an act or engages in conduct, otherwise criminal, when the idea to
commit the crime . . . originated in the mind of another ....
" (emphasis added).
85. 5 Cal. App. 3d at 506, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 276.

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 5
particular aspect of the CALJIC entrapment instructions, criticized
by writers as based upon illusory authority, 86 was ignored in a
1965 California Supreme Court decision 87 that sustained a refusal to
instruct on entrapment where there was no evidence that the "entrapper" was a person working in cooperation with the police at the
time of the inducement. This result and the approach taken in
Gregg appear to be consistent with federal case law. 88
Because California's rationale for the entrapment defense is based
on grounds of public policy in deterring impermissible police conduct,
the Gregg decision would appear to be the only logical one regarding the issue of whether private citizens can entrap a defendant. On
the other hand, defendants who misinterpret California's use of the
origin of intent test as being consistent with the majority rationale of
Sorrells, Sherman, -andRussell, might justifiably question "the anomalous difference between the treatment of a defendant who is solicited by
a private individual and one who is entrapped by a government agent." 80
A corollary issue is the determination of what kinds of persons are
to be classified as "police agents" for purposes of applying the entrapment defense. There is very little case law dealing with this issue, 90 but a 1924 California decision9 1 constitutes authority for treating private detectives as police agents for purposes of the defense.
Another California case has held that anyone who acts with official
encouragement or assistance should be treated as a government
92
agent.
CONSIDERATIONS IN FORMULATING AN APPROPRIATE,

STATUTORY DEFINITION

A.

A PreliminaryIssue

As suggested initially, a statutory formulation of the entrapment defense would be particularly helpful in resolving many of the uncertainties that continue to surround application of the defense in California courts. However, a statutory embodiment would be helpful
only insofar as it recognizes the practical courtroom status of the de86. See Sinetar, A Belated Look at CALJIC, 43 CAL. S.BJ. 546, 547-49 (1968).
87. People v. Perez, 62 Cal. 2d 769, 401 P.2d 934, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1965).
88. See, e.g., United States v. DeAlesandro, 361 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1966); United
States v. Comi, 336 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1964).
89. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973). Justice Rehnquist raised
this issue in his majority opinion, but made no attempt to resolve it.
90. For a discussion of this issue see Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants,
Spies, Stool Pigeons,and Agent Provocateurs,60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1109 (1951).
91. In re Moore, 70 Cal. App. 483, 233 P. 805 (1924).
92. People v. Makovsky, 3 Cal. 2d 366, 44 P.2d 536 (1934).
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fense and the legal justification for its use, as these have evolved
in California decisions. Thus an initial issue confronting any move
toward a statutory definition of entrapment is whether the present
California rule allowing the jury to make the determination on the
question of entrapment is consistent with the underlying rationale for
the defense, as articulated in Benford and reaffirmed in recent cases.
If California were to wholly adopt the police conduct approach advocated by former Chief Justice Traynor and set forth in the concurring opinions of Sorrells and Sherman and the dissent in Russell,
consistency in legal theory would seem to compel that the determination of illegal police conduct be left to the trial court. On the other

hand, if the constant utilization in California courts of the jury-determined origin of intent test were to be interpreted as reflecting verbatim
the federal formulation of Russell, -then the police conduct rationale
underlying California's use of the defense would have to be disputed.
The preceding analysis of California cases indicates, however, that
California has not fully adopted either of the two contrasting federal
formulations of the entrapment defense. Thus the problem is not
that of choosing between the competing approaches to the defense
which have traditionally divided the United States Supreme Court.
Rather, the question is whether California's compromise stance,
which combines the jury-determined origin of intent test with an underlying police conduct rationale, is consistent with the purpose of the
defense in this state.
B.

A Basic Formulationof CalifornidsApproach

There is no question that the purpose for the entrapment defense
in this state is to deter "illegal police conduct,"9 3 rather than to exclude from the provisions of its criminal statutes defendants who are
not considered sufficiently blameworthy to warrant punishment because they were entrapped.9 4 Likewise, a close reading of California
cases reveals that there is no real disagreement that the measure for
93. As the Moran decision explained the California rationale, "[tlhe courts have
created the defense as a control on illegal police conduct 'out of regard for [the
court's] own dignity and in the exercise of its power and the performance of its duty
to formulate and apply proper standards for judicial enforcement of the criminal law."'

1 Cal. 3d at 760-61, 463 P.2d at 765-66, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 413-14, citing from People

v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d at 9, 345 P.2d at 933.

94. This "diminished culpability" rationale still appears to be the federal approach. The Russell decision maintained that entrapment
is rooted not in any authority of the Judicial Branch to dismiss prosecutions
for what it feels to have been "overzealous law enforcement," but instead in
the notion that Congress could not have intended criminal punishment for a
defendant who

411 U.S. at 435.

. . .

was induced to commit [the crime] by the government.
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"illegal" police conduct is whether the police have "manufactured"
the crime in the sense of originating the criminal scheme. 9 The unresolved question in California today thus concerns the correct test
to employ in determining whether the police or their agents have manufactured a crime.
Moran and many entrapment cases before and after it 9 have employed the origin of intent test to determine whether a crime was
truly created by the police, or whether the police have simply provided the opportunity for a predisposed defendant to fulfill his criminal design. Justice Traynor's opposing view would approach the question "objectively," ignoring the particular defendant's predisposition,
or lack thereof, and consider hypothetically whether the police conduct created a substantial risk of inducing into criminal activity persons unready and unwilling to commit a crime.
Thus, unlike the
federal majority approach in which a non-predisposed defendant is considered to lack sufficient culpability to be punished, 9 under either California approach courts would not treat a finding of predisposition on
the part of the defendant as an end in itself. Rather, a finding of lack
of predisposition is simply a means to the end of ferreting out impermis.
sible police conduct. 99
C. Weighing the Merits of the Tests for Manufactured Crime
Various arguments can be made both for and against the two California views as to the proper method of measuring police conduct
that has "manufactured" crime, and a statutory definition for entrapment should take these into account in formulating a California standard for the defense. Justice Traynor, in his Moran dissent, made
several arguments in favor of leaving the determination of impermissible police conduct to the trial judge. He felt that the crucial question was whether the judge or the jury could best achieve the purpose of the defense. A jury verdict of guilty or not guilty, he ar95. Chief Justice Traynor's Moran dissent acknowledged such in stating: "[A police officer] may not engage in methods that might induce persons to commit offenses
who would not otherwise do so, thereby manufacturing rather than preventing crime."
1 Cal. 3d at 765, 463 P.2d at 769, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 417 (emphasis added).
96. See cases cited in note 40 supra.
97. 1 Cal. 3d at 765, 463 P.2d at 769, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
98. See note 94 supra. Note that California's police conduct rationale avoids the
problem pertaining to the federal diminished culpability approach in regards to the
anomalous difference between the treatment of a defendant induced by government
agents and one induced by a private citizen.
99. Under a police conduct rationale, the courts deter impermissible police conduct by applying the entrapment defense, while impermissible conduct by private citizens that induces others into crime is controlled by prosecuting those private citizens
for solicitation.
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gued, tells the police nothing about the jury's evaluation of the police
conduct. A guilty verdict might simply mean that the jury did not
believe the part of the defendant's testimony that would have established entrapment. On the other hand, a not guilty verdict would be
unenlightening because in California a defendant may assert entrapIn addition, he
ment and also deny that he committed the crime. 10
pointed out that "[i]n other areas involving police conduct, we have
recognized the paramount importance of committing the assessment
of such conduct to the court," 10 1 and cited the fact that trial courts
determine the admissibility of confessions and other evidence claimed
to have been illegally obtained.1 02
Weaknesses in this argument, however, were pointed out by the
majority opinion in Russell. First, those "other areas" to which assessment of police conduct has been committed to the court involve
violations of independent constitutional rights of the defendant, such
as occurred in Mapp and Miranda, whereas Russell specifically rejects the notion that the entrapment defense is of constitutional dimensions.1 0 3 And in no California case to date has the argument
been made, as it was in Russell, that the defense should be elevated
to a constitutional status.'04 Secondly, Russell points out that even if
the courts were to recognize an analogy between the entrapment defense and the exclusionary rule, a police conduct approach would go
further than the exclusionary principle since it would absolutely bar
certain prosecutions.'0 5 Furthermore, the rules in Weeks v. United
States'0 0 andMcNabb v. United States,10 7 under which courts exclude the
fruits of illegal searches, seizures, and confessions, are based upon
the courts' traditional power over exclusion and admission of evidence.' 08
There are additional arguments to be made against complete adoption of the police conduct approach to the defense of entrapment.
Under this objective approach, a particularly wary but predisposed
defendant might require such a high degree of police encouragement
100. 1 Cal. 3d at 766, 463 P.2d at 769, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
101. Id.
102. See People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955); CAL. Evw. CODE
§405; CAL. PEN. CODE §1538.5.
103. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
104. Writers have argued that the entrapment defense should be of constitutional
dimensions, and the constitutional guarantees suggested to be applicable to the defense
include due process, the right against self-incrimination, and the fourth amendment
probable cause requirement. See Comment, The Defense of Entrapment: A Plea for
ConstitutionalStandards, 20 U. FLA. L. REV. 63 (1967).
105. 411 U.S. at 430.
106. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
107. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
108. See Note, The Defense of Entrapment, 73 HAnv. L. REv. 1333, 1334 (1960).
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and involvement to overcome his hesitancy that a court focusing only
upon the nature and degree of the police involvement would be compelled to find entrapment. The argument is made in Russell that it
is not especially desirable to immunize from prosecution one who has
planned to commit a crime, and then committed it, simply because
the government's inducements "might have seduced a hypothetical individual who was not so predisposed."' 1° Predisposed but wary defendants very often are the professional criminals, who constitute the
greatest crime problem, and freeing them while disciplining the police might justifiably be considered too high a price for society to
pay. 1 0 It has been suggested that other methods ought to exist
for dealing with undesirable police conduct in such cases, such as
prosecuting the police officers or agents involved for solicitation."'
A final compelling argument against adoption of the so-called objective test advocated by Justice Traynor relates to his remark in
Moran that "the line must be drawn between methods likely to persuade those otherwise unwilling to commit an offense from methods

likely to persuade only those who are ready to do

So.111. 2

A ques-

tion suggests itself: Other than mere requests to indulge in illegal
activity, what methods would be likely to tempt only the hardened
criminal?
There are several positive arguments which can be made in favor of
using the jury-determined origin of intent test to ascertain whether the
police or their agents have manufactured a crime. These, together with
arguments previously made against complete adoption of a police conduct approach, appear to strongly outweigh the objections to California's current compromise entrapment approach. First, whereas
the police conduct approach would have the tendency to adopt rather
rigid standards in testing for entrapment in certain situations, use of
an origin of intent test would offer a more flexible means for such.
For instance, in Williamson v. United States,"13 use of a police informant who was paid on a contingent fee basis was considered to constitute prima facie evidence of entrapment. A more flexible approach
would appear to be that utilized in People v. Rusling,"4 a California
case which rejected such a rigid measure for entrapment and left the
determination to the jury. A second argument for leaving the measure109. 411 U.S. at 434.

110. See MODEL PENAL CODE §2.13, Comment 3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
111. See Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 PENN. L.

Rhv. 245 (1942).
112. 1 Cal. 3d at 765, 463 P.2d at 769, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
113. 311F.2d 441 (SthCir. 1962).
114. 268 Cal. App. 2d 930, 74 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1969).

620

1974 / California Entrapment Law

ment of impermissible police conduct to -thejury arises from the fact that
in a great many of the entrapment cases the prosecution and defense
offer widely divergent versions of the facts.115 Resolution of the conflicts would appear to be best left to the finder of fact.
Perhaps the strongest argument to be made in justification of California's current practice of combining the origin of intent test with
an underlying police conduct rationale is that the combination does
not appear to unreasonably deprive a defendant of the availability of the
defense when it would otherwise be available had the federal minority
formulation of the defense been employed. A classic example of this
point is People v. Goree," 6 in which the entrapment defense did apply when it would not have if the police conduct approach had been
used. In Goree an undercover agent was shooting pool with the defendant, who happened to mention that he was saving his last fifty
cents in order to buy a marijuana cigarette. Prior to this remark
the narcotics agent had not suspected the defendant of any illegal
activity. The agent then casually inquired as to whether the defendant would purchase one for him. The defendant did so as a mere
favor, making no money on the transaction. As the court itself observed, it would be extremely difficult to condemn the police agent's
conduct as unreasonable or overly conducive 17 if viewed objectively,
as Justice Traynor's approach would necessitate. Under such an application, the entrapment defense would fail. But left to a jury, not
even the defendant's obvious "hair trigger susceptibility"" 8 would
compel a finding that the defendant was predisposed to furnish the
cigarette, and the jury in Goree acquitted the defendant of that particular charge.
D.

Consistency and Workability of California'sApproach

On the basis of the foregoing analysis and argument, the question
framed earlier as to whether it is consistent for California courts to
utilize the origin of intent test for entrapment when the defense in this
state is based upon a public policy rationale can be answered in the
affirmative. Just as the exclusionary rule has been created to deter
unconstitutional infringements by the government, the entrapment defense, as it has evolved in California, is the device used by the courts
to deter police conduct which is deemed impermissible, not because it
115.
(1956).
116.
117.
118.

See, for example, People v. Ramos, 146 Cal. App. 2d 110, 303 P.2d 783
240 Cal. App. 2d 304, 49 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1966).
Id. at 307 n.3, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 393 n.3.
Id. at 310, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
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violates a defendant's constitutional guarantees, but because public
policy dictates against the production of crime by law enforcement
personnel.
Using such a rationale, California's delegation to the jury of the
duty to determine whether police conduct is impermissible as to a particular defendant causes this state to assume a unique stance regarding use of the entrapment defense. The preceding analysis demonstrates that this compromise position can be a workable one and best
reflects the purpose for the defense in California without unduly restricting its availability to defendants. However, as discussed earlier,
this unusual stance is capable of misinterpretation and misapplication, and since the assertion of the entrapment defense grows steadily more popular in California courts as the number of drug-related
prosecutions continues to rise, it is an appropriate time for the legislature to consider formulating a statutory definition of the entrapment defense that would reflect this compromise stance.
E. Guidelinesfor a Statutory Definition
Any such statutory embodiment should recognize the defense in
California as a device to deter police conduct that is impermissible,
with "impermissibility" to be measured by a determination as to
whether the police involvement has "manufactured" the alleged
crime. This determination, in turn, rests upon the defendant's predisposition, or lack thereof, and -the responsibility for making such a
finding should be statutorily delegated to the finder of fact. The
burden of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence
should likewise be ascribed to the defendant, since entrapment in California is not based upon the defendant's innocence and thus is not
subject to the provisions of Penal Code Section 1096.119
To the extent that such could be codified, a statutory definition
would provide a far better source for comprehending the nature,
purpose, and applicability of the defense than does the present bulk of
semantically confusing and sometimes conflicting California case
law. A statutory definition would not require provision for the exceptional circumstance alluded to by Justice Rehnquist in Russell, in
which "outrageous"'120 police conduct would absolutely bar the governnent from prosecuting a defendant. Regardless of the defendant's
predisposition, where police conduct is sufficiently outrageous, the
119. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
120. 411 U.S. at 431.
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due process principles embodied in Rochin v. California21 would appear to be fully applicable.
CONCLUSION

An analysis of California entrapment decisions reveals that the police conduct rationale, first enunciated in the 1959 Benford case, remains unquestioned to the present time, as indicated by Moran and
more recently Patty. Uncertainty, however, has arisen over the means
with which the stated public policy objective, deterrence of impermissible police conduct, is to be carried into practice. A weighing of arguments both for and against the two competing measures of impermissible
police conduct 15oints to use of the jury-determined origin of intent test
as the more soundly based approach. Use of such a measure necessarily
causes California to strike a middle position between the two contrasting federal formulations of the defense which have divided the United
States Supreme Court for the past 41 years. California's approach,
however, is both workable and desirable, and a statutory definition for
entrapment embodying this compromise stance would come at a time
when increased frequency of assertion of the defense and continuing
uncertainties over its application combine to insure continued life for
the entrapment issue in California courts. 12 2
Michael T. Fogarty

121. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
122. The following proposed definition would embody the California approach by
codifying both the deterrence rationale for the defense and the jury-determined origin
of intent test for its practical application:
ENTrAPmENT

A. It is a bar to prosecution that the defendant was entrapped by unlawful
police conduct.
B. Police conduct is deemed unlawful for purposes of this defense when a
defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence to the finder of fact
that the alleged crime was produced by a public officer or employee, or
agent of either, in whom the intent to commit the crime originated.

